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Abstract
When the sample size is not too small, M-estimators of regression
coefficients are approximately normal and unbiased. This leads to the
familiar frequentist inference in terms of normality-based confidence
intervals and p-values. From a Bayesian perspective, use of the
(improper) uniform prior yields matching results in the sense that
posterior quantiles agree with one-sided confidence bounds. For this,
and various other reasons, the uniform prior is often considered
objective or non-informative. In spite of this, we argue that the uniform
prior is not suitable as a default prior for inference about a regression
coefficient in the context of the bio-medical and social sciences. We
propose that a more suitable default choice is the normal distribution
with mean zero and standard deviation equal to the standard error
of the M-estimator. We base this recommendation on two arguments.
First, we show that this prior is non-informative for inference about the
sign of the regression coefficient. Secondly, we show that this prior
agrees well with a meta-analysis of 50 articles from the MEDLINE
database.
Keywords
objective prior, Jeffreys prior, objective Bayes, empirical Bayes, type S
error, type M error, p-value debate, normal-normal model
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1 Introduction
Regression modeling plays a central role in the bio-medical and social
sciences. Linear and generalized linear models (with and without random
effects), generalized estimating equations (GEE) and quantile regression
offer great flexibility and are easy to use. Also, simple two group
comparisons can usually be viewed in terms of a regression model. When
the sample size is not too small, the statistical analysis can be based on the
fact that M-estimators of regression coefficients are approximately normal
and unbiased1. This leads to the familiar (frequentist) inference in terms
of normality-based confidence intervals and p-values.
We will avoid small sample issues by assuming that we have a normally
distributed, unbiased estimatorB of a regression coefficient β with known
standard error se. Then we have for any fixed β
Pβ(B − 1.96 se < β < B + 1.96 se) = 0.95. (1)
While our set-up may appear to be overly simplistic, we emphasize that
inference about regression parameters based on Wald type confidence
intervals (and associated p-values) is very common throughout the life
sciences. Exact intervals based on the t-distribution are available in linear
models, but the difference is already very small when the degrees of
freedom exceed, say, 40.
Statement (1) describes the long-run coverage performance of the
random interval [B − 1.96 se, B + 1.96 se]. However, this confidence
statement is often mistakenly interpreted as the conditional probability
statement
P (B − 1.96 se < β < B + 1.96 se | B = b) = 0.95, (2)
where b is the observed value of the estimator and β is viewed as a
random variable. We refer to Greenland et al.2 for a discussion of this
misinterpretation. Statement (2) is arguably more relevant than (1) because
it refers to the data at hand, rather than the procedure being used. This
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may explain, at least in part, the pervasiveness of the misinterpretation; it
is what researchers want to know.
Statement (2) is actually only valid if we assume that β has the
(improper) uniform or “flat” prior distribution. This has lead some authors
to consider the uniform prior to be an objective or non-informative
prior3. Many other criteria have been proposed by which a prior may be
considered to be objective4, but in the normal location model with known
standard deviation they all yield the (improper) uniform distribution as the
unique objective prior.
We find that the flat prior is used for Bayesian inference about regression
coefficients in two distinct situations. It is used explicitly with the goal
of objective Bayesian inference5 and implicitly whenever the confidence
interval for a regression coefficient is interpreted as a credibility interval.
This paper consists of two parts. In the first part (section 2) we
discuss the objective Bayesian approach. Loosely speaking, the goal
of this approach is to minimize the influence of the prior on the
posterior. However, this depends on which aspect of the posterior we are
considering. While the flat prior may well be considered non-informative
for β, it is very informative both for the magnitude and the sign of β. This
is just a consequence of the fact that a very diffuse prior favors large values
of |β|. Hence, use of the flat prior implies that the magnitude of β will be
inflated and the evidence about its sign will be exaggerated
This is problematic, because for regression coefficients (other than the
intercept) we are typically most interested in the sign and the magnitude.
In section 2.3 we go one step further and argue that the sign is often of
primary interest. We start from the premise that associations studied in
the life sciences are almost never exactly zero and that it is therefore of
special importance to quantify the evidence for the direction of a certain
association. From a Bayesian perspective, this means that we are primarily
interested in P (β > 0 | B).
Now, if we want to avoid undue influence of the prior on P (β > 0 | B),
it is natural to use a prior for β such that P (β > 0 | B) has the standard
uniform distribution. Theorem 1 asserts that the normal distribution with
mean zero and standard deviation equal to the standard error of the
unbiased estimator is such a prior. In other words, this prior may be
considered to be non-informative for inference about the sign of β.
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In the second part of the paper (section 3) we turn to the Empirical
Bayesian approach6 7. MEDLINE is an extensive bibliographic database
of life sciences and biomedical information. Compiled by the United
States National Library of Medicine, it is freely available on the Internet
and searchable via PubMed. In the absence of additional prior information,
we may consider papers from MEDLINE to be exchangeable. This implies
that we can use a sample of MEDLINE papers to estimate a suitable
prior distribution for regression coefficients. Such an estimated prior is
objective in the sense that it is essentially free of any personal opinions
or biases. Based on a sample of 50 MEDLINE articles, we estimate
the distribution of regression coefficients (other than the intercept) to be
normal with mean zero and standard deviation 1.28 se.
Objective Bayes and Empirical Bayes both aim for objectivity, but from
very different points of view. It is therefore quite remarkable that both
approaches lead to such similar priors. This supports the main conclusion
of this paper that the flat prior is not suitable for objective inference about
regression coefficients.
In section 3.2 we discuss several reasons why the factor of 1.28 is
likely to be an overestimate. Therefore, we recommend that the normal
distribution with mean zero and standard deviation se is a suitably
conservative default prior. This prior combines the theoretical support of
section 2.3 with the empirical evidence from section 3.1. We do stress that
this default prior is not always appropriate. In section 4 discuss several
situations in which it is not to be used.
Upon observing B = b, the resulting posterior is the normal distribution
with mean b/2 and standard deviation se /
√
2. Since statement (1) holds
for all β, it remains valid under the proposed prior. However, the
conditional coverage of the usual confidence interval becomes
P (B − 1.96 se < β < B + 1.96 se | B = b)
= Φ
(
b√
2 se
+ 1.96
√
2
)
− Φ
(
b√
2 se
− 1.96
√
2
)
, (3)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. We show
the conditional coverage in Figure 1. Instead of b, we put the two-sided
p-value 2Φ(−|b|/ se) on the x-axis to emphasize that with increasing
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significance, the coverage probability decreases. Also, we have
P
(
B
2
− 1.96 se√
2
< β <
B
2
+ 1.96
se√
2
| B = b
)
= 0.95, (4)
and
P (β > 0 | B = b) = Φ(b/
√
2 se). (5)
Finally, P (β < 0 | B = b) = 1− P (β > 0 | B = b).
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Figure 1. Conditional coverage when β has the normal prior with mean zero and standard
deviation se, as a function of the two-sided p-value.
We note that several other authors8 9 10 11 12 have warned against using
the flat prior as a default choice and some of those authors have proposed
priors that are qualitatively similar to ours, in the sense of being symmetric
and concentrated around zero.
2 Objective Bayes
The Bayesian method offers a principled and coherent approach to
statistical inference, but it does require the specification of a prior
distribution. If one is unable or unwilling to formalize external information
into a prior, it is tempting to use a so-called objective (or non-informative)
prior to try to avoid undue influence on the posterior5.
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Many criteria have been proposed by which a prior may be considered to
be objective4. In the normal location model with known standard deviation
they all point to the flat prior. Here we review two important criteria; one
based on invariance of the statistical decision problem and one based on
the principle of parameterization invariance. We will argue that neither
criterium is as compelling as it may seem. An information theoretic
argument in section 2.3 leads us to propose the normal distribution with
mean zero and standard deviation equal to the standard error of the
unbiased estimator as a suitable objective prior.
2.1 Invariant decision problems
The statistical decision problem of estimating the mean β of a normal
distribution under squared error loss is invariant under translation13. In
the absence of prior information, it is sensible that the prior distribution
on β should be translation-invariant because that will imply that the Bayes
rule is translation-invariant as well13. The uniform distribution is the only
such distribution over the real numbers (up to a multiplicative constant).
Applied researchers are often particularly interested in the sign or
the magnitude of a regression coefficient. This focus may be reflected
formally by a loss function that depends on β only through its sign or
magnitude. Under such loss functions, the decision problem is no longer
invariant and the above argument no longer applies.
Suppose we want to estimate the magnitude of β. Since B is unbiased
for β, it follows by Jensen’s inequality that |B| is positively biased for |β|.
For fixed β, |B| has the folded normal distribution with mean
Eβ|B| = |β|+
√
2
pi
se e−β
2/2 se2 − 2|β|Φ
(
−|β|
se
)
. (6)
The bias Eβ|B| − |β| is maximal at β = 0 when it is equal to
√
2/pi se ≈
0.8 se. Now, if we use the flat prior, then the posterior distribution of β
given B = b is normal with mean x and standard deviation se. Hence, the
posterior distribution of |β| is the folded normal with mean
E(|β| | B = b) = |b|+
√
2
pi
se e−b
2/2 se2 − 2|b|Φ
(
−|b|
se
)
(7)
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This posterior mean is the Bayes estimator of |β| under squared error loss.
We see that it is even larger than |B|, which is already positively biased
for |β|. Evidently, the flat prior is very informative for |β|.
Similar problems arise with inference about the sign of β. If we use the
flat prior then
P (sgn(β) = sgn(B) | B = b) = Φ
( |b|
se
)
. (8)
Now, the unimodal, symmetric priors are a natural class to consider for
objective inference about the sign of β. The following proposition is
essentially due to Casella and Berger14.
Proposition 1. Suppose β has a prior distribution pi which has a
unimodal density and is symmetric about zero. Also, suppose that
conditionally on β, B has the normal distribution with mean β and
standard deviation se > 0. For any b,
Ppi(sgn(β) = sgn(B) | B = b) ≤ Φ
( |b|
se
)
. (9)
The proposition asserts that the perceived evidence that β has the same
sign as B is maximal under the uniform prior among all unimodal,
symmetric priors. We conclude that the flat prior is very informative for
inference about the sign. This issue is has long been recognized and was
discussed, for instance, by Berger and Mortera8.
2.2 Parameterization invariance
Parameterization invariance refers to the principle that the construction
of a non-informative prior should not depend on the parameterization
that happens to have been chosen. This principle leads to Jeffreys
rule15 which is to define the prior as (proportional to) the square root
of the Fisher information. This construction is unaffected by smooth
reparameterization. In the normal location problem with known standard
deviation, Jeffreys prior is the uniform distribution. We will now present a
non-smooth reparameterization that does affect Jeffreys rule.
We can reparameterize the location problem quite naturally in terms
of the sign and absolute value of β. This reparameterization is of course
not smooth and the Fisher information is not defined because the sign is
discrete. However, it is natural to put the Bernoulli(1/2) prior on the sign.
Prepared using sagej.cls
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Writing θ = |β|, the distribution of B becomes a two-component mixture
with density
f(b | θ) = 1
2 se
ϕ
(
b+ θ
se
)
+
1
2 se
ϕ
(
b− θ
se
)
, (10)
where ϕ is the standard normal density function. Jeffreys prior on θ is
defined as
f(θ) ∝
(
Eθ
(
∂
∂θ
log f(b | θ)
)2)1/2
, (11)
where
∂
∂θ
log f(b | θ) (12)
∝ −(b+ θ)ϕ((b+ θ)/ se) + (b− θ)ϕ((b− θ)/ se)
ϕ((b+ θ)/ se) + ϕ((b− θ)/ se) .
A closed form expression for (11) is not available, but we can easily
compute it. We show Jeffreys prior for various values of se in Figure 2.
We see that this prior is no longer uniform. In fact, it is even more widely
dispersed.
2.3 The parameter of interest
Almost all criteria that have been put forward for constructing a
non-informative prior agree on the uniform distribution for a location
parameter. However, this prior leads to overestimation of the magnitude
and overconfidence about the sign. Here, we take a different approach.
Much research in the bio-medical and social sciences is aimed at
assessing the evidence about the association between two variables, often
after correcting for additional variables. The inferential approach that
is most often used, is to perform a hypothesis test. Hypothesis testing
is ubiquitous, but it is not without criticism. We refer to the American
Statistical Association’s statement16 for a discussion of the issues involved
in the so-called “p-value debate”. Much of the criticism of hypothesis
testing centers on the fact that the p-value is often misinterpreted as the
posterior probability that the null hypothesis of no association is true.
In many situations, it is unlikely that β is exactly zero. If one assumes
from the outset that β is probably not exactly zero, then attention naturally
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Figure 2. Jeffreys prior for θ = |β| when se = 0.5, 1, 2 (from left to right).
shifts to inference about the sign of β 9. John Tukey has argued this point
particularly forcefully: “All we know about the world teaches us that the
effects of A and B are always different – in some decimal place – for any A
and B. Thus asking “Are the effects different?” is foolish. What we should
be answering first is “Can we tell the direction in which the effects of A
differ from the effects of B?” In other words, can we be confident about
the direction from A to B?”17
Following this reasoning, we propose that the (data-dependent)
parameter P (β > 0 | B) is of primary importance in much empirical
research. If indeed P (β > 0 | B) is of primary interest and if one wants to
avoid undue influence of the prior, then it is quite natural to put the uniform
prior on this parameter18 19 20. It is not immediately obvious which prior on
β implies the uniform prior on P (β > 0 | B), but we have the following
connection between the uniform and the normal distribution, which is new
as far as we know.
Theorem 1. Suppose the prior distribution of β is normal with mean
0 and standard deviation se and conditionally on β, B has the normal
Prepared using sagej.cls
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distribution with mean β and standard deviation se. Then P (β > 0 | B)
has the standard uniform distribution.
We believe that N(0, se2) is actually the only prior for β such that
P (β > 0 | B) has the uniform distribution, but we have not been able to
prove it. It is of course unique among all normal distributions. Now, on the
basis of Theorem 1, we propose that theN(0, se2) prior on β is appropriate
for objective Bayesian inference about the sign of β.
It is interesting to mention that our proposal would follow from an
application of the reference method of Bernardo21 to the parameter P (β >
0 | B). However, it should be stressed that the formal definition of the
reference prior does not cover data dependent parameters.
Recall that se represents the standard error of the estimator B and
therefore depends on the sample size. Consequently, the proposed prior
depends on the sample size as well. This may seem awkward from
a subjective Bayesian point of view and requires justification. Now,
objective Bayesian inference aims to avoid undue influence of the prior on
the posterior. Since the prior exerts its influence on the posterior through
the likelihood, the choice of objective prior will often depend on the
likelihood. While this may be at odds with the subjective Bayesian point
of view, it is inherent in the goal of objectivity22.
A researcher’s prior beliefs about β are surely not informed by the
sample size, but it does work the other way around. It is typically the case
that the researcher’s prior beliefs influence the sample size through (formal
or informal) sample size calculations. Therefore, it is not unreasonable for
the reader of a bio-medical paper to take the sample size into account in
his or her prior beliefs about β.
3 Empirical Bayes
The fact that we are considering a regression coefficient in the context
of the bio-medical or social sciences may in itself be taken as prior
information. Here, we will use external information from the the extensive
MEDLINE database to inform our prior beliefs, but do so in an objective
manner. In the absence of additional prior information, we consider papers
from MEDLINE to be exchangeable. This implies that we can use a
sample of MEDLINE papers to estimate a suitable prior. Estimating the
prior is often referred to as Empirical Bayes6 7.
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Let βij denote the i-th regression coefficient in paper j and assume the
following hierarchical model.
• φj has the normal distribution with mean φ and variance σ2
• Conditionally on φj , βij has the normal distribution with mean zero
and variance φj se2ij
• Conditionally on βij , Bij has the normal distribution with mean βij
and variance se2ij
It follows that conditionally on φj , the “z-value” Zij = Bij/ seij has the
normal distribution with mean zero and variance φj + 1. The idea behind
the model is that some studies have a larger sample size or a more
predictable outcome than others, and that will lead to z-values of larger
magnitude. To capture this in our model, we have the variance of the z-
values depend on the study.
Now, conditionally on φj , Z2ij has the Gamma distribution with mean
φj + 1 and shape 1/2. Therefore, based on a sample of z-values, we can
estimate the parameters of this model by fitting a generalized linear mixed
model with Gamma distribution, shape 1/2, identity link and Gaussian
random effect per study, to the squared z-values. If we use an offset of
one, then the intercept of this model estimates φ. Note that the prior we
proposed in section 2.3 for objective inference about the sign has φ = 1.
We will now describe how we collected our data.
3.1 MEDLINE
It is well-known that for various reasons (p-hacking, fishing, file drawer
effect, etc.) reported effects tend to be inflated23 24 25 26 27. We have tried
to collect “honest” effects as follows. It is a fairly common practice in the
life sciences to build multivariate regression models in two steps. First, the
researchers run a number of univariate regressions for all predictors that
they believe could have an important effect. Next, those predictors with
a p-value below some threshold are selected for the multivariate model.
While this approach is statistically unsound, we believe that the univariate
regressions should be largely unaffected by selection on significance,
simply because that selection is still to be done!
We entered the search term “univariate multivariate regression” into the
PubMed system which yielded over 20,000 results. We selected the 80
most recent (in August 2018), consecutive results. Of these, 50 reported
univariate and multivariate p-values. The 30 other papers were either
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unavailable under the license of the University of Leiden, or did not report
p-values precisely (summaries such as p < 0.01 or p < 0.05 or “NS” are
common). In case results were reported for more than one outcome, we
used only the first. We collected in total 576 univariate p-values (all two-
sided). We did not collect p-values for the intercept, or p-values based on
F tests. Also, we did not collect p-values below 0.001. There are two
reasons for that. First, because p-values below 0.001 are usually only
reported as such. Second, because we would consider such a small p-value
as evidence against our default prior and would not recommend its use in
those cases, c.f. section 4. All data are available as a supplement to this
article.
We converted the two-sided p-values to absolute z-values through |z| =
|Φ−1(p/2)| and display the result in Figure 3. The fact that we do not
have the sign of the z-values is not relevant for our purpose, because we
consider only symmetric distributions as plausible default priors.
absolute Z−value
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20
60
10
0
Figure 3. Histogram of 576 absolute z-values from 50 MEDLINE articles. Restricted to
[0, 3.29].
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3.2 Results
We have fitted the Gamma regression model as described above to 576
squared z -values obtained from 50 MEDLINE articles. We are primarily
interested in
√
φ which is the relation between the standard deviation of
the prior and the standard error of the unbiased estimator. We estimate
√
φ
to be 1.28 (95% CI: 1.12 to 1.42). The details of our analysis including the
R code are in the supplemental material. In addition to the (conditional)
mixed model, we also fitted a marginal model. As the results were very
similar, we do not report them here. They are included in the supplemental
material.
Our proposal in section 2.3 for an objective prior for inference about
the sign has
√
φ = 1, while we estimate
√
φ = 1.28 for a typical study.
We consider this to be quite close, especially compared to the flat prior.
Moreover, the value 1.28 is likely to be an over-estimate, because it
is safe to assume that even the univariate z-values we have collected
are inflated. For example, researchers may have dichotomized certain
predictor variables in a favorable way, or decided not to report predictors
that showed no association with the outcome at all.
4 Discussion
The flat prior is used for Bayesian inference about regression coefficients
in two distinct situations. It is used explicitly with the goal of objective
Bayesian inference5 and implicitly whenever the confidence interval
for a regression coefficient is interpreted as a credibility interval. This
is problematic, because the uniform distribution is not realistic at all
in the context of bio-medical research. Consequently, its use leads
to overestimation of the magnitude of the regression coefficient and
overconfidence about its sign.
In this paper, we have proposed a different prior to be used as a default.
Suppose we have an unbiased, normally distributed estimator B of β with
standard error se. Then we have argued that the normal distribution with
mean zero and standard deviation se is more suitable as a default prior
than the uniform distribution. Equivalently, upon observing B = b, the
normal distribution with mean b/2 and standard deviation se /
√
2 is a more
suitable default posterior than the normal distribution with mean b and
standard deviation se.
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We based our proposal on an information theoretic argument (Theorem
1), but also demonstrated that our prior agrees quite well with data about
regression coefficients we gathered from 50 papers from the bio-medical
and social sciences. We do want to stress that our default prior is not meant
to be a universal prior. There are, at least, four circumstances when our
proposed default prior should not be used.
1. Our prior is concentrated around zero which is usually not
appropriate for the intercept as there is no reason a priori why the
intercept should be close to zero.
2. A different prior should be used when additional external prior
information is available. We do feel, however, that it is the
responsibility of the researcher to convince the reader (i.e. the
scientific community) that his or her study is different from a typical
MEDLINE study.
3. Our proposed prior should not be used if a two-sided p-value less
than 0.001 is observed. This is a form of prior-data conflict28,
because such a small p-value is quite unlikely under our prior. To
be precise, a two-sided p-value less than 0.001 corresponds to a z-
value exceeding 3.29 in absolute value, and the probability of that
event is about 2% under our prior.
4. Our proposed prior should not be used in situations in high
dimensional situations where we can use empirical Bayes methods
to reliably estimate a prior that is specific to the study under
consideration. Many examples of such situations are discussed in a
book by Efron about large scale inference7.
A limitation of our work is that have only considered the case where we
have an unbiased, normally distributed estimator with known standard
deviation. This is indeed restrictive, but note that the usual frequentist
inference about regression coefficients almost always relies on the
(asymptotic) normality and unbiasedness of their estimators. This is the
case for linear and generalized linear models with and without random
effects, as well as for generalized estimating equations (GEE) and quantile
regression1.
The fact that the standard deviation of the estimator is typically
unknown and must be estimated, can be taken into account – to some
extent – as follows. Suppose we have observed B = b and its associated
two-sided p-value p. Then we can compute the absolute z-value as |z| =
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|Φ−1(p/2)| and an “implied standard error” as se = |b|/|z|. This implied
value may be larger than the estimated standard error, depending on how
the p-value was calculated.
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Supplemental material
Proof. (Proposition 1) The proposition is an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.2 of Casella
and Berger 14.
Proof. (Theorem 1) The conditional distribution of β given B is normal with mean M = B/2
and variance v = se2 /2. Therefore,
P (β > 0 | B) = Φ(M/√v) = Φ(B/
√
2 se).
The marginal distribution of B is normal with mean 0 and variance 2 se2 and hence B/
√
2 se
has the standard normal distribution. By the familiar probability integral transform, it follows that
P (β > 0 | B) has the standard uniform distribution.
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